The Futility of Insurgent Leader Assassination by Sharifi, Arian
The recent killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, 
the leader of the Tehrik-e-Taiban-e-Pakistan 
(TTP), by a CIA drone strike has generated 
much controversy over the implications of the 
attack.  On the one hand, American authori-
ties, who had declared a $5 million bounty on 
Hakimullah’s head, celebrated the event as a 
successful strike and a positive development in 
the on-going war on terror.  On the other hand, 
Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali 
Kahn, condemned the incident, stating that the 
elimination of Hakimullah will sabotage Pa-
kistan’s efforts at forging a peace deal with the 
TTP.  In the same vein, many Pakistani politi-
cal parties, from Imran Khan’s liberal Pakistan 
Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), to the ultra Islamist 
groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP) 
and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), have all 
denounced the attack, demanding that the Pa-
kistani government block NATO’s logistical 
supply line to Afghanistan that runs through Pa-
kistan.  Afghan President Hamid Karzai, too, ex-
pressed his criticism of the timing of the attack, 
noting that it could affect Pakistan’s cooperation 
with Afghanistan’s embryonic peace process. 
 This incident, and the divisive respons-
es to it, revives the question of whether targeted 
killing of insurgent leaders is an effective coun-
terinsurgency tactic, an issue much debated in 
academic and policy circles. Proponents of the 
tactic argue that killing insurgent leaders inca-
pacitates insurgent organizations, deters addi-
tional insurgent violence against the state, and 
signals the determination of the state to fight 
the insurgents.  Opponents of the tactic warn 
that targeted killing of an insurgent leader will 
further radicalize his followers, triggering an 
escalation of retaliatory attacks by the group 
as a means of avenging the slain leader.   
 This paper falls within the later camp, 
arguing that targeted killing of insurgent lead-
ers has minimal operational value, which is 
substantially outweighed by its unwanted conse-
quences. I must clarify that by insurgent leaders, 
I mean the supreme leaders of insurgent groups; 
T
H
E
 f
U
T
IL
IT
y
 O
f 
IN
S
U
R
g
E
N
T
 L
E
A
D
E
R 
A
S
S
A
S
S
IN
A
T
IO
N
7 | Ex-Patt Magazine of Foreign Affairs
throughout the FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwah, 
and lately in parts of Punjab and Sindh provinc-
es.  The TTP is also known to utilize ungoverned 
territories in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nooristan 
provinces, and has been linked to attacks against 
Afghan and NATO installations in the country. 
 Although the TTP has conducted opera-
tions in Afghanistan against NATO and Afghan 
security forces, its primary targets have tradi-
tionally been Pakistani government personnel 
and installations. The TTP has been implicated 
in many high profile terrorist and insurgent op-
erations across Pakistan, including the assassi-
nation of former Pakistani Prime Minister Bena-
zir Bhutto in 2007; the bombing of the Marriot 
Hotel in 2008; the massive attack on Pakistani 
army’s headquarter in 2009; the assassination 
attempt of young activist Malala Yousafzai in 
2012; a number of massive jail breaks that freed 
hundreds of militants; as well as hundreds of as-
saults, explosions, and suicide bombings against 
military and civilian targets across Pakistan. 
The TTP has also demonstrated its will to strike 
targets beyond the borders of Pakistan, and has 
shown some capacity to do so, most notably 
with the December 2009 suicide bombing of a 
CIA station in Khost, Afghanistan, as well as 
the failed attempt to explode a car bomb in New 
York’s Times Square in 2010. 
 Although drone attacks against the TTP 
had been conducted for many years before, the 
United States officially designated the TTP a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on 1 Sep-
tember, 2010.  In addition to killing numerous 
mid-level TTP commanders and personnel, CIA 
operated drones have so far assassinated two of 
the TTP’s top leaders – Baitullah Mehsud in Au-
gust 2009 , and Hakimullah Mehsud on 1 No-
vember, 2013.  As the newly selected TTP leader, 
Mullah Fazlullah has vowed to continue the leg-
acy of his predecessors, and avenge Hakimullah’s 
blood by increasing attacks against American 
targets.  
To Kill or to Let Live: An Unending Debate
not their operational commanders.  I maintain 
that through “routinization” and “institutional-
ization” of a leader’s charisma, his importance 
to the survival and functioning of an insurgent 
organization decreases over time. Therefore, his 
elimination is less likely to pose a major blow 
to the organization. Meanwhile, the killing of a 
leader will likely further radicalize the group by 
(a) turning the slain leader into an iconic “mar-
tyr”, which will inspire followers to engage in re-
taliatory action to avenge the leader’s blood; and 
(b) giving the insurgent organization a sense of 
being under siege and attack, thereby facilitating 
the rise to power of more radical elements within 
the group. While these arguments are corrobo-
rated by many examples, I primarily focus on the 
TTP, as the assassination of two of its supreme 
leaders – Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 and 
Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013 – pro-
vide rich ground for empirical analyses.
 
An Organizational Synopsis
 Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) is an 
umbrella organization of various Islamist mili-
tant groups that operate predominantly in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwah province of Paki-
stan. The organization was founded in 2007 
by Baitullah Mehsud in order to unite the dis-
persed Pakistani militant groups in the area.  The 
TTP’s main objectives include the enforcement 
of Sharia in Pakistan, fighting NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, and conducting “defensive” jihad 
against the Pakistani military.  Currently, about 
30 militant groups are believed to fight under the 
TTP umbrella, commanding a total of 30,000 to 
35,000 fighters.  
The TTP has a loose organizational structure 
where member groups enjoy considerable auton-
omy in their respective geographical areas, but 
are collectively joined in the TTP and get strate-
gic direction from its Emir, or the supreme lead-
er. The organization is headquartered in South 
Waziristan, but its area of operation extends 
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focuses on the operational aspect of leadership, 
maintaining that killing an insurgent leader will 
take away a group’s base of knowledge and skills 
in conducting operations, mobilizing resources, 
organizing financing, and synchronizing attacks. 
Patrick Johnston’s findings through a large-N 
analysis of insurgent organizations seem to cor-
roborate these assertions, specifically claiming 
that decapitating insurgent leaders “(1) increas-
es the chances of war termination; (2) 
increases the probability of govern-
ment victory; (3) reduces the intensity 
of militant violence; and (4) reduces 
the frequency of insurgent attacks.” 
 On the other side of the debate are 
scholars who believe that assassinating 
insurgent leaders is counterproductive 
to the overall effort of counterinsurgen-
cy. The core of this argument rests upon 
the theories that emphasize the impor-
tance of the general political and strate-
gic environment – rather than of single 
insurgent leaders – to the durability and 
effectiveness of an insurgent organiza-
tion.  These theories argue that insur-
gent organizations rest upon an array of 
actors, institutions, and structures that 
are rooted deeply in society.  Therefore, 
removing an insurgent leader will likely 
have a minimal effect on the functioning 
of the insurgent organization. Leaders 
may be critical at the birth of an orga-
nization due to their charismatic abilities in or-
ganizing collective action, but their importance 
decreases over time. For instance, Jenna Jordan 
argues that a leader’s charisma can be transferred 
to other individuals within the group; hence the 
“removal of a leader would not necessarily result 
in the collapse of an organization.”  Elsewhere, 
Jordan argues that “going after the leader may 
strengthen a terrorist group’s resolve, result in 
retaliatory attacks, increase public sympathy for 
the organization, or produce more lethal attacks.” 
 Similarly, other scholars point to the 
radicalization effect of leadership decapitation 
 The “agency vs. structure” debate in so-
cial science divides scholars over the issue of 
targeted killing of insurgent leaders. Generally, 
those who advocate the use of the tactic empha-
size the centrality of the leader’s personality in 
the functioning and durability of an insurgent 
organization, thereby arguing that the elimi-
nation of the leader will likely make the orga-
nization dysfunctional. For instance, Kent Oots 
asserts that “if the authorities can remove the 
leadership, an organization will cease to func-
tion.”  He highlights the significance of an insur-
gent leader in maintaining internal unity, argu-
ing that the killing of a group’s leader will make 
it prone to infighting and collapse.  Observing 
the Palestinian insurgent organizations, Steven 
David emphasizes the role of the leader’s opera-
tional abilities, arguing that once killed, leaders 
are difficult to replace due to the long time need-
ed for the surrogates to acquire the same level 
of experience and expertise.  Daniel Byman also 
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is primarily a political phenomenon, the utility 
of military action in a counterinsurgency cam-
paign must be measured based on its political 
ramifications for the overall war effort. 
Theoretical Argument
 The centerpiece of my argument in this 
paper is that targeted killing of insurgent lead-
ers causes more harm than benefit to a coun-
terinsurgency campaign. This argument has 
two parts. In the first part, I highlight two main 
ways in which a leader plays an important role 
within an insurgent organization, and show how 
over time his importance to the functioning and 
survival of the organization decreases. Killing 
a leader, therefore, can make little difference to 
an insurgent organization. In the second part, I 
discuss two ways in which killing an insurgent 
leader will likely further radicalize the group, 
strengthening its resolve to intensify its violent 
campaign against the state. 
Leaders and Insurgent Organizations 
Charismatic leadership can be instrumental in 
the establishment, functioning, and survival of 
an insurgent organization. The 19th century Ger-
man sociologist, Max Weber, defined charisma as 
a “quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and 
treated as endowed with supernatural, superhu-
man, or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities.”  According to Weber, these powers 
and qualities “are not accessible to the ordinary 
person, but are regarded as of divine origin or 
as exemplary, and on the basis of them the indi-
vidual concerned is treated as a leader.”  Weber’s 
definition of charisma is intentionally broad and 
implies that different qualities in different cate-
gories of movements come to define charisma. 
As Robert Tucker posits, qualities such as mir-
acle-working powers in religiously salvationist 
groups, revolution-making powers in political 
revolutionary movements, or war-making capa-
of insurgent groups. Aaron Mannes claims that 
killing insurgent leaders can cause “greater rad-
icalization of the targeted terrorist group, elimi-
nation of possible negotiating partners, and the 
triggering of retaliatory attacks.”  In his study of 
the Palestinian public opinion polls, David Jae-
ger found that after the Israeli killing of Palestin-
ian insurgent leaders, approval ratings for more 
radical figures increased.  Peter Rosendorff and 
Todd Sandler argue that by generating more 
grievances, Israel’s targeted killing of Palestinian 
insurgent leaders increases the recruitment of 
new fighters into Palestinian insurgent groups. 
Related to the public grievance argument is the 
“martyrdom effect” of insurgent leader assassina-
tion. The argument is that instead of degrading a 
group’s morale, killing its leader increases insur-
gents’ resolve, and intensifies their desire to use vi-
olence in retaliation for the government’s action. 
 Finally, scholars suggest that the threat 
of targeting insurgent groups’ leaders pushes 
the groups to decentralize, flattening their orga-
nizational structures as a means of defying the 
impact of leadership assassination and increas-
ing their durability. This trend is most evident 
in the evolution of Al Qaeda after 9/11 into its 
current networked structure.  The assumption is 
that as an organization becomes less hierarchical 
and divided into multiple cells that are loosely 
connected to each other, it becomes less vulnera-
ble to state predation since it is no longer wholly 
dependent upon a single leader or a single unit. 
Independent parts will be capable of persisting 
long after other parts have been neutralized. 
 The debate over the effectiveness of in-
surgent leader assassination is ongoing with no 
final resolution in sight. While arguments on 
both sides of the debate make conceptual sense, 
a major weakness of the proponents of the tactic 
is that they tend to evaluate the utility of the tac-
tic quite narrowly. That eliminating an insurgent 
leader has some operational value to a counter-
insurgency campaign is unquestionable; what is 
up for debate is whether its benefits are worth 
enduring its unwanted costs. Since insurgency 
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Operational Competence 
In addition to rallying public support for the 
insurgents’ cause, conducting an insurgency 
requires operational competence in mobilizing 
resources such as money, weapons, equipment, 
medical supplies, food, clothing, etc.; organiz-
ing safe havens, training grounds, instructors, 
etc.; establishing organizational structures com-
mensurate to the nature, size, and objectives of 
the organization; creating strategic plans and 
ensuring the implementation of those plans at 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; 
and other functions of this nature. An insurgent 
leader, therefore, must be a capable manager 
and a shrewd strategist. He must be a master in 
the use of various forms of warfare, including 
guerrilla combat, terrorism, sabotage, intelli-
gence and counterintelligence, and psycholog-
ical warfare. He must know the utility of each 
of these forms of warfare, and know when each 
one must be used. An insurgent leader must be 
able to integrate geography and terrain, weath-
er, population, type of weapon, form of war-
fare, and the number and kind of fighters into 
a unified strategy that would increase the effec-
bilities in movements that seek to achieve their 
goals by military means, become important. 
 Using Tucker’s framework, charis-
ma in the context of insurgent leaders can be 
summed up in two categories of qualities. I 
call them “inspirational persona” and “opera-
tional competence”, respectively: 
Inspirational Persona
Because insurgent organizations are generally 
revolutionary groups that are seeking to affect 
political change through the use of political, 
social and military means, a charismatic lead-
er must have the ability to rally public support 
behind his cause and convince people to re-
spond to his call to arms .  Insurgent groups 
appear where there is some fundamental po-
litical or social problem, for which often the 
state or a foreign occupier is blamed. A charis-
matic insurgent leader must be able to identify 
the problem, propose a solution, and convinc-
ingly offer himself as one peculiarly qualified 
to lead the people out of their predicament. He 
must be able to create a strong ideological nar-
rative that appeals to the followers. This means 
a leader must have a vision and the ability to 
communicate that vision clearly to his current 
and potential followers. He needs to radiate an 
idealized, heroic, selfless, and devoted public 
image; one that would convince others to fol-
low him by engaging in high-risk political and 
military activity. This was most evident in the 
case of many legendary insurgent leaders such 
as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, 
Ahmad Shah Masoud, and others. 
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 Weber’s argument here is somewhat 
self-contradictory, however. By Weber’s 
own definition, charisma is fundamentally 
a personal, even God-given, phenomenon, 
so how can something that is by nature per-
sonal become depersonalized? Robert Tuck-
er suggests that charisma does not become 
depersonalized, but it becomes routinized 
by continuing to survive within the move-
ment in the form of the cult of the original 
leader.  It will still be something associated 
with the personality of the original leader, 
embodied within the movement as a legacy 
that continues to inspire followers. Phenom-
ena such as Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, 
etc., that survived the leaders themselves are 
examples of such routinization of charisma. 
Succeeding leaders in the movement may be 
viewed as representatives of the original lead-
er, tasked with moving his legacy forward. 
 Tucker’s proposition is useful for our 
discussion, but it covers only half of what 
charisma entails in the context of insurgent 
organizations. As discussed earlier, depend-
ing on the type and objective of a movement, 
different qualities or powers in a leader come 
to define charisma. In the case of insurgent or-
ganizations, charisma involves two categories 
of qualities, what I called “inspirational per-
sona” and “operational competence”, mastery 
in both of which is required of a successful 
insurgent leader. While inspirational persona 
has to do with a leader’s personal charm and 
ability to motivate followers, operational com-
petence entails the leader’s practical skills in 
organizing and leading an insurgent organiza-
tion. To state that both of these qualities can 
be routinized the way Tucker defines routini-
zation – as charisma evolving into a cult or leg-
tiveness of the overall insurgency campaign. 
 In sum, a charismatic insurgent leader 
has a special persona that legitimizes him as 
the leader of a group and rallies support be-
hind him, as well as operational capabilities 
that help him organize the group, garner re-
sources, and develop and implement strategies. 
Based on this reasoning, therefore, proponents 
of the targeted killing of insurgent leaders ar-
gue that a leader is the most crucial part of an 
insurgent group whose elimination can cripple, 
even collapse the organization. However, as I 
argue below, a leader’s inspirational persona is 
routinized and his operational competence in-
stitutionalized, thereby limiting the importance 
of the leader to the functioning of the organiza-
tion over time. 
Routinization and Institutionalization of Charisma
Max Weber referred to “routinization” and “de-
personalization” as the process by which charis-
ma undergoes a complete transformation from 
an extraordinary and purely personal phenom-
enon into an established authority structure 
that is no longer dependent upon the personal 
powers and qualities of the incumbent lead-
er.  In the process of routinization, charisma is 
transmitted from leader to leader through the 
established rules of succession. Through deper-
sonalization, charisma evolves into a heredi-
tary phenomenon as exemplified in royal suc-
cession, or into institutional charisma attached 
to an office as with the practice of priesthood. 
acy of the original leader within the movement 
– would be misguiding. A more useful approach 
would be to deal with inspirational persona and 
operational competence separately, and demon-
strate how these qualities are transferred from 
an insurgent leader into the established author-
ity and structure of the organization over time. 
 Inspirational persona is routinized over 
time to become part of the organization’s cul-
ture, narrative, and ideology. It survives as the 
legacy of the original leader long after he is dead, 
transmitted to future generations of followers in 
the form of theories, stories, legends, and myths. 
While the organization inevitably undergoes 
changes overtime, the cult of the original leader 
remains as a broad guiding framework for action. 
Innovations are often justified and legitimized as 
part of the original leader’s legacy. Future leaders 
may be viewed as the epitomes of the original 
leader who follow his legacy by moving the or-
ganization’s cause forward. This means that the 
leader himself gradually becomes irrelevant and 
his death – especially if assassinated by the enemy 
– will only strengthen his legacy and solidify his 
cult as part of the ideology of the organization. 
 While a charismatic insurgent leader’s 
inspirational persona is routinized, his opera-
tional competence is institutionalized over time. 
Institutionalization in this context refers to the 
process by which an insurgent leader’s practical 
skills in managing personnel, handling financ-
es, mobilizing resources, developing strategies 
“The signers of the Declaration of Independence  ac-
knowledged their readiness for martyrdom when they 
pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred 
honor to the cause of freedom. Many Americans be-
lieved that George Washington made immeasurable 
sacrifices for the cause of liberty when he suffered with 
the half-clothed, half frozen heroes at Valley Forge. 
Familiar with the general heritage of sacrifice and 
martyrdom, American authors, poets, preachers, and 
popular historians applied the title martyr to specific 
individuals. They thus strove to invest the American 
national experience with transcendent meaning and 
to strengthen the American national consciousness 
through solidarity with the sacrifice of a dead hero.”
C A S E  S T U D Y
This process is clearly visible in the evolution 
of the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). Bait-
ullah Mehsud, the original TTP leader, played 
a crucial role in igniting Islamist militancy in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Ar-
eas (FATA), and later in unifying numerous mil-
itant groups under the TTP umbrella. By 2007, 
Baitullah was well-known as the leader of the 
strongest Pakistani militant group in the FATA, 
and a natural candidate to lead the emerging 
coalition of militant organizations called the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan. Especially known 
for his deployment of suicide bombers, “[Bai-
tullah] was more notorious in Pakistan than 
Osama bin Laden and as feared as the Iraqi 
insurgent Abu Musab al Zarqawi”.  His alleged 
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Min-
ister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 only 
aided Baitullah’s fame locally, nationally, and 
internationally. 
Coming from a modest family background, 
and with no formal education of any kind, Bai-
tuallah rose to prominence based purely on his 
personal leadership qualities. His inspirational 
persona made him a natural leader, enabling 
him to rally widespread public support for his 
cause and recruit thousands of fighters in the 
span of two years. His power of persuasion en-
abled him to turn the numerous Pakistani militant 
groups with no guiding principles or clear sense 
of direction into a unified insurgent organization 
with a defined ideology and established ob-
jectives. His ruthlessness, fearlessness, strategic 
thought, and good managerial skills were vital 
in mobilizing resources, establishing organiza-
tional structures, and ensuring the TTP’s evolu-
tion into a strong insurgent group capable of 
conducting high profile attacks across Pakistan. 
The TTP’s leadership succession shows an up-
ward curve of radicalization, going from Bait-
ullah to Hakimulla to Fazlullah. Upon the assas-
sination of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009, 
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and battle plans, etc. are absorbed within the 
organization through transferring the skills to 
other personnel; creating norms, standards, and 
procedures; establishing bureaucratic structures 
with specialized units; and developing policies 
and strategies. At the birth of an insurgent or-
ganization, the leader personally handles, or at 
least supervises the handling of, many of these 
tasks. His skills are critical to the establishment 
of the organization and for moving it forward. 
But as the organization expands over time, it 
becomes neither possible nor necessary for the 
leader to engage in the handling of technical 
day-to-day business. These responsibilities are 
gradually transferred over to the bureaucracy 
and then down to the chain of command. The 
leader becomes confined to handling high-lev-
el political and strategic issues. Even at the 
highest level, a leader often has a number of 
deputies and confidants who conduct the actu-
al work under his supervision. Thus, the lead-
er becomes more or less symbolic, losing his 
operational importance to the organization. 
 To sum up, a charismatic leader is es-
sential to the birth and growth of an insurgent 
organization, as he rallies support, recruits 
fighters, mobilizes resources, establishes bu-
reaucratic structures, and gives the organiza-
tion an ideology and a sense of direction. But 
the relationship of the leader to the organization 
is dialectical – the more successful he is at es-
tablishing the organization, the less important 
he becomes to the organization over time, due 
to the routinization of his inspirational per-
sona and the institutionalization of his oper-
ational competence. His assassination, there-
fore, will have a trivial, if any, impact on the 
functioning and survival of the organization. 
 As the organization evolved over time, 
however, Baitullah’s personal qualities and skills 
became less important to the TTP. By the time 
of his assassination in August 2009, the TTP was 
well-known as the deadliest insurgent group in 
the area, posing a serious challenge to the Paki-
stani government, as evidenced by several large 
two serious candidates contested for succession 
– Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman. 
Hakimullah was by far more radical than his 
competitor, notably in his fierce opposition to 
peace talks and his commitment to stepping 
up the organization’s violent campaign.  Giv-
en the environment within the organization – 
anger, fear, and paranoia – Hakimullah was 
perceived as the strongest candidate and the 
best fit to lead the TTP. And by all accounts, 
the TTP became larger, stronger, deadli-
er, and more radicalized under Hakimullah’s 
leadership as discussed earlier in this paper. 
The same experience was repeated after the 
recent assassination of Hakimullah. The new 
leader Mullah Fazlullah became famous when 
he began broadcasting daily sermons on ille-
gal FM frequencies. In these sermons, he ada-
mantly denounced the Pakistani state and the 
American presence in neighboring Afghanistan, 
calling for jihad against both.  He also promot-
ed his extreme interpretation of the Sharia, 
condemning issues such as female education, 
polio vaccination, as well as music and films. 
Fazlullah primarily commanded the Taliban 
group in Swat, establishing Sharia courts and 
handing out savage punishments. Under Fazlul-
lah’s reign of terror, the “Green Square in Min-
gora, the main town of Swat, became known 
as ‘Bloody Square’ for the slaughtered, bul-
let-ridden bodies that were hung in it almost 
every day.”  By word and by deed, Fazlul-
lah has proved his unbending commitment to 
bringing Sharia to Pakistan, and his prepared-
ness to engage in any level of ruthlessness to 
make that happen.  While his predecessor had 
finally become open to holding peace talks 
with the Pakistani state, Fazlullah rejected the 
idea of reconciliation once and for all and de-
clared that no talks would be held.  Four years 
of service as the leader of the TTP may have 
moderated Hakimullah Mehsud to make him 
amenable to peace talks, but his assassination 
and the subsequent rise to power of Mullah Fa-
zlullah set the clock back, re-radicalizing the 
organization.
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Pakistani military operations in the FATA in 
2009.  By then, Baitullah had eliminated most of 
his rivals, united most of the local militant groups, 
and established a fully-operational insurgent or-
ganization that was capable of enduring with 
or without him. He had even produced three 
deputies – Hakimullah Mehsud, Asmatullah 
Mehsud, and Wali-ur- Rehman – any of whom 
could comfortably replace Baitullah in the event 
of his death.  By the time of his assassination, 
Baitullah’s inspirational persona had been fully 
routinized into an ideology and narrative that 
could continue to motivate TTP fighters. And 
his operational competence had been institu-
tionalized in the form of organizational bureau-
cracies, command structures, and new leaders 
with skills sufficient to ensure the TTP’s survival. 
 After Baitullah’s assassination, Hakimul-
lah Mehsud took over as leader of the TTP. Al-
though barely 30 years old then, Hakimullah 
proved quite capable of filling Baitullah’s shoes 
and moving the TTP forward. Having taken 
over a fully established organization, however, 
Hakimullah’s job was considerably easier than 
that of his predecessor who had started the or-
ganization from zero. Hakimullah continued to 
build upon Baitullah’s achievements, consider-
ably stepping up the TTP’s size and the sphere 
and scope of its operations. 
Radicalizing Impact of Insurgent Leader Assassination
 Killing an insurgent leader is likely to 
radicalize his organization in two ways: (1) 
through the “martyrdom effect”, and (2) by fa-
cilitating the rise of radical elements within the 
insurgent organization. 
The Martyrdom Effect
 Revolutionary movements generally val-
ue traits such as heroism, bravery, selflessness, 
“The Arabic 
equivalent 
of the term 
martyrdom  is 
shahada. 
to see 
to witness
to testify
or to become a model.”
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and sacrifice. Martyrdom ranks at the top of the 
value list, demonstrating the highest level of sac-
rifice a revolutionary can make in the pursuit 
of his or her cause. The concept of martyrdom 
originated in religious movements, and has had 
a special place within the histories of the three 
major monotheistic religions. The mythologies 
surrounding the sacrifice of the Rabbi Akiba 
ben-Josef, the crucifixion of Jesus Crist, and the 
suffering and death of Imam Hussein, for instance, 
continue to have great symbolic importance 
to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, respectively. 
 In more recent times, secular revolu-
tionary movements have embraced the concept 
of martyrdom and have used it strategically as 
a tool of propaganda to generate sympathy for 
their causes, increase unity within their organi-
zations, and recruit more followers and fighters. 
The American revolutionaries were fully aware of 
the power of martyrdom, and sought to utilize it 
to further their cause. As Eyal Naveh points out: 
 Sacrifice lay at the core of the fascist 
ideology, and fascist movements utilized the 
concept of martyrdom very effectively to rally 
support. As Donald Allgrove writes of the Nazi 
propaganda on the use of martyrdom, “Josef 
Goebbels ensured that each military organi-
zation could claim an archetypical martyr. The 
SA identified with its fallen songwriter Horst 
Wessel. Herbert Norkus - butchered by com-
munist thugs - inspired the Hitler Youth orga-
nizations. Assassinated Obergruppenfuhrer 
Reinhard Heydrich served as a symbol for the 
SS. Finally, the Luftwaffe commemorated their 
leading fallen ace, Colonel Werner Molders.” 
 Perhaps the strongest celebrators of mar-
tyrdom are the modern-day Islamist militant 
groups. The Arabic equivalent of the term mar-
tyrdom is shahada, which literally means to “see”, 
to “witness” to “testify”, or to “become a model”. 
Shahada is central to the concept of jihad, which 
can mean either a personal endeavor for inner pu-
rification, or an armed struggle in defense of the 
Islamic faith.  In the context of modern Islamist 
militancy, jihad exclusively refers to the latter 
definition, and thus a shaheed is one who sacri-
fices his or her life in the path of Islam. This sim-
plification of the terms jihad and shaheed may be 
problematic from a theological perspective, but 
providing the correct or the most encompassing 
definition for these terms is not the purpose of 
this paper. The intention here is to demonstrate 
the way modern-day Islamist militant groups 
view the phenomenon of martyrdom and how 
they seek to exploit it for strategic purposes. And 
for this purpose, the above definitions suffice. 
  Islamists view martyrdom not only as 
the highest degree of sacrifice one can make in 
the path of Islam, but also as the biggest prize 
one can receive from God. They claim that by 
becoming a martyr, one will get a direct pass 
to paradise. For instance, the Khomeini regime 
during the Iran-Iraq war issued a “key to the 
Garden of Eden” – a plastic key made in Taiwan 
– to every Basij fighter going to the front, sym-
bolizing martyrs’ direct admission to paradise. 
The Basij engaged in what came to be known as 
“human wave raids” where thousands of elderly 
or young children marched to the front – most 
of them unarmed. The purpose of these raids 
Martyrdom was more strongly revered, and effec-
tively used as a tool of propaganda, by totalitarian 
revolutionary movements such as communists and 
fascists. Stripping the concept of any religious con-
notation, communist revolutionary movements 
across the world embraced martyrdom as a phe-
nomenon that proved the greatest human sacrifice 
in the path of the communist cause.  The martyr-
dom of Hans Beimler, the German International 
Brigade Commissar, in the Spanish Civil War, for 
instance, was commemorated in songs for his com-
munist comrades to sing as they left for battle.  The 
preservation of Vladimir Lenin’s body is a symbolic 
display of a great leader who sacrificed his life in the 
path of the revolution and the cause of communism. 
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 This trend can be clearly observed in the 
case of the killing of two TTP leaders. Immedi-
ately after the assassination of Baitullah Mehsud 
in August 2009, his successor, Hakimullah Me-
hsud, vowed to target U.S. interests worldwide, 
including American cities, to avenge Baitullah’s 
martyrdom.  In December 2009, Humam Khalil 
Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian national who 
had posed as an informant, carried out a sui-
cide attack inside a CIA base in Afghanistan’s 
Khost Province, killing 7 operatives and in-
juring 6.  After the incident, the TTP released 
a video showing Hakimullah Mehsud sitting 
beside al-Balawi, stating that the forthcoming 
suicide attack against the CIA would be in re-
taliation for Baitullah Mehsud’s assassination. 
In 2011, the TTP released a video tape, declar-
ing that it would soon deliver ten coordinat-
ed attacks in the U.S. and Europe, this time to 
avenge the martyrdom of Osama bin Laden. 
 It is too soon to determine what the TTP 
will manage to do in retaliation to the recent 
assassination of Hakimullah Mehsud, but the 
organization has vowed to step up its campaign 
of violence and conduct a wave of terror attacks 
to avenge the death of its slain leader.  Blaming 
the Pakistani government for collaborating with 
the U.S., a high-ranking TTP militant Asmat-
ullah Shaheen is quoted to have said, “We will 
target security forces, government installations, 
political leaders and police” in retaliation for 
Hakimullah’s assassination.  
The Rise of Radical Figures
 The targeted killing of an insurgent lead-
er is likely to facilitate the rise to power of more 
radical figures within the group, for at least two 
reasons. First, the leader’s assassination gives the 
organization a sense of being under siege and 
attack. The incident could be perceived as the 
beginning of a widespread offensive by the state 
with the objective of completely uprooting the 
organization. Fear and paranoia fills the orga-
was to “clear mines, breach obstacles (often by 
laying on top of concertina wire), and to absorb 
enemy fire.”  Martyrdom, therefore, is idolized 
as something that each and every member of 
an Islamist militant movement should aspire 
to. Osama bin Laden praised martyrdom time 
and again in his speeches, and even purportedly 
wished his own martyrdom when in one of his 
recorded tapes he said, “I pray my demise isn’t 
on a coffin bearing green mantles. I wish my 
demise to be in the eagle’s belly … Indeed on 
my demise I will become a martyr”. And a mar-
tyr he did become in the eyes of his followers. 
 Islamist militant groups use martyrdom 
to legitimize abhorrent violent actions such as 
suicide operations, and motivate fighters to en-
gage in such activities. Suicide attacks, for in-
stance, are called “martyrdom operations”. Often 
before the attacks, statements by would-be sui-
cide bombers are recorded on tape in which they 
testify that they are undertaking the operations 
willingly and that they are proud to have the 
chance to achieve martyrdom.  When possible, 
militant groups also record the attacks on tape, 
and then edit them to include the initial testimony 
along with propagandistic narrations, songs and 
special effects. These videos are released on jihadi 
websites to attract support and recruit fighters, 
and are shown internally to boost motivation. 
 While Islamist militant groups vener-
ate all of their martyrs, a leader’s martyrdom is 
special, as they see in him a model and example, 
one whom they wish to follow and emulate. A 
charismatic leader is greatly revered when alive, 
but his martyrdom further idolizes his persona 
and validates his path. He turns into the embod-
iment of righteousness, selflessness, heroism, 
and sacrifice whose legacy is to be followed and 
whose blood is to be avenged. This inspires fur-
ther violence on the part of the insurgent group, 
both as a means of retaliation for the death of the 
leader, as well as a demonstration of the group’s 
willingness and ability to continue the path of 
the slain leader. 
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nization, demonstrating the need for hardening 
and tightening of defenses. A time of perceived 
distress, fear, and anger naturally strengthens 
the position of the more hardline figures to 
replace the slain leader and defend the orga-
nization against the expected state onslaught. 
After all, a time of war requires a “war-time 
consigliere”, to use the Godfather terminology. 
 Second, leadership requires pragmatism, 
and pragmatism in turn necessitates flexibility 
and moderation. The act of serving in leadership 
positions often increases individuals’ pragma-
tism against the rigidity of their ideological aspi-
rations, given the scope of their responsibilities 
and the reality of things they need to deal with. 
Thus, more often than not, insurgent leaders be-
come relatively moderate in their behavior over 
time even if they still cling to their ideological 
ambitions. But experience comes with time, so 
it takes several years for an insurgent leader to 
obtain the needed experience and appreciate the 
necessity of flexibility and moderation. Once a 
leader is killed, however, a new, usually young-
er and more idealistic figure will come to power. 
The new leader needs to go through the expe-
riences of his predecessor in order to learn his 
lessons and become more pragmatic, during 
which time the behavior of the insurgent group 
will be more radical. Killing an insurgent orga-
nization’s successive leaders, therefore, means 
working against the possible moderation of 
the organization by repeating the cycle of rad-
icalization-to-moderation-to-re-radicalization. 
  
Conclusion
 The relationship between charismatic 
insurgent leaders and insurgent organizations 
is dialectical: Charismatic leaders are critical to 
the birth of insurgent organizations, as they ral-
ly support behind their cause, recruit fighters, 
mobilize resources, and establish organizational 
structures and chains of command. But the more 
successful they are at setting up the organization 
over time, the less important they become to the 
functioning and survival of the organization. 
This is because their charisma – inspirational 
persona and operational competence – is routin-
ized and institutionalized within the organiza-
tion, surviving the leader in the shape of a legacy 
and a durable structure. Therefore, assassinating 
an insurgent leader will at best have a minimum 
impact on the organization, i.e. by temporari-
ly damaging the fighters’ morale and demon-
strating the state’s will to fight the insurgents. 
 From a counterinsurgency perspective, 
however, these marginal benefits are greatly 
outweighed by the unwanted consequences of 
assassinating insurgent leaders due to the mar-
tyrdom effect and the radicalizing impact of the 
tactic. As seen in the case of the Tehrik-e-Tal-
iban-e-Pakistan, targeted assassination turns 
the slain leader into an iconic martyr, inspiring 
intensified retaliatory violence by the group. 
Meanwhile, the leader’s assassination puts the 
insurgent organization in a defensive posture, 
aiding the rise to prominence of more zealous 
figures within the organization, which sets back 
the clock to the organization’s gradual modera-
tion. The implications of this analysis for coun-
terinsurgency policy are straight forward. States 
that are involved in fighting insurgencies must 
refrain from killing top insurgent leaders. In-
stead, focusing on the elimination of mid-level 
commanders, who have practical operational 
value to insurgent organizations, and whose tar-
geted killing will likely generate fewer unwanted 
consequences, might be a better policy option 
within an overall counterinsurgency campaign. 
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